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The Right of the Older Worker to Accrue
Pension Benefits: Problems of Federal Law
Exceptions and State Law Preemption
By Benjamin W. Gale*

One of the most critical problems facing legislatures is how to
assure that workers will be adequately provided for after they retire. By instituting the social security system and by encouraging
the rapid growth in pension plans through tax incentives," the federal government greatly improved the prospect of retirement security for American workers. In recent years, however, confronted
with the effects of inflation, dwindling funds in the social security
system, and a high incidence of bankruptcy and forfeiture of pension funds, the federal government has had to take further steps to
promote retirement security.2
One federal response has been to regulate the funding and forfeitability of private pension plans with the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 19743 (ERISA). By withholding favored tax
status from pension plans violating ERISA standards, Congress
has made certain that pensions remain solvent and that benefits
vest.
Another federal response has been to encourage Americans to
continue working after the age of sixty-five, the usual retirement
age.5 By prohibiting mandatory retirement until age seventy
through the 1978 Amendments' to the Age Discrimination in Em* B.A. 1975, Harvard College. Member, Second Year Class.
1. See LR.C. §§ 401-415. See also H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Seass. 2, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4640.
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (statement of purpose).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31,
42 U.S.C.).
4. See I.R.C. §§ 401, 411.
5. S. REP. No., 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 504, 507.
6. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 29
U.S.C.). The mandatory retirement prohibition is found at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. M
1979).
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ployment Act of 1967' (ADEA), Congress has enabled workers to
continue supporting themselves through their older years and has
thus postponed those workers' social security dependency.
The goal of assuring adequate retirement income through private pension plan regulation, however, has not been reached. Because many private pension plans freeze accrual of benefits once an
employee reaches a "normal retirement age,"8 such pension benefits may never grow to a level sufficient to support a comfortable
post-retirement life. An employee who continues working past the
normal retirement age works on merely to see inflation erode that
retirement income to which he or she is entitled.
ERISA, passed when mandatory retirement was still a widespread employment practice,9 does not address the issue of retirement benefit accrual after normal retirement age.10 The ADEA,
7.
8.

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
For examples of pension plans containing this type of provision, see U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIGEST OF SELECTED PENSION PLANS (1976-1978 ed.)
[hereinafter cited as DIGEST]. Almost all of the pension plans described therein contain such
a provision. For the present purposes of the ADEA, "normal retirement age" is the age at
which an employee's participation rights in an individual retirement plan may terminate.
See 124 CONG. REC. 84450 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Javits). The term
"normal retirement age" is defined in both ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code as: "the
time a plan participant attains the normal retirement age under the plan, or ... the later of
...the time a plan participant attains age 65, or... the 10th anniversary of the time a
plan participant commenced participation in the plan." I.R.C. § 411(a)(8); 29 U.S.C. §
1002(24) (1976).
ERISA uses "normal retirement age" only to set the date on which accrued retirement
benefits must fully vest, and not the date on which an employee is expected to retire or after
which benefit accrual should cease. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976). In fact, the committee sponsoring ERISA believed that an employee should be allowed to participate in a retirement
plan in which employer contributions relate to years worked, or a defined contribution plan
such as a profit-sharing or money purchase plan, for as long as the employee works. See
H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sass., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4670, 4712. For plans with mandatory retirement, "normal retirement age" marked the age
at which an employee had accrued maximum benefits under the plan simply because employment would be thereafter terminated. Because mandatory retirement before age 70 was
prohibited in the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA, employment now often continues past
the "normal retirement age." Logically, there is no reason for the cessation of benefit accrual at that point, but because ERISA was written when mandatory retirement at age 65
was still
allowed, that age continues to set the point after which an employer is no longer
required to contribute to an individual's retirement plan in order to qualify for favored tax
status. See I.R.C. § 411(a)(1)-(6); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1976); 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(c)-1(f)(2)
(1974). See also notes 36-38 & accompanying text infra.
9. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEWS 506.
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1976); see also I.R.C. § 411(a)(1)-(6); 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(c)1(f)(2) (1976).
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however, which generally addresses age discrimination in the
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,"'1
could be interpreted to require equal rights to participate in pension plans for all workers up to age seventy. It would have to be
shown, however, that the exception provision for benefit plans in
section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA 1 2 does not exclude the right to accrue
such retirement benefits from the Act's protection. Section 4(f)(2)
of the ADEA provides: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer
• . .to observe the terms of...

any bona fide employee benefit

plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not
a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Chapter."' Because one
of the purposes of the Act is to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination,14 section 4(f)(2) could conceivably be interpreted to treat the
freezing of retirement benefits at the normal retirement age as a
subterfuge to evade that purpose. Section 4(f)(2) has not been so
interpreted, 5 however; the legislative history of the ADEA and the
1980 interpretations" promulgated by the Department of Labor
(DOL) contain statements indicating that section 4(f)(2) permits
the discontinuance of employer contributions when the employee
reaches the normal retirement age.' 7 Furthermore, although the in'
terpretations require the employer to show cost justifcation for
any age discrimination in the terms of vacation and sick leave
11. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976) provides that. "It shall be unlawful for an employer-(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or (3) to
reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter."
12. Ido § 623(f)(2).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 621(b).
15. See notes 36-58 & accompanying text infra.
16. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.1-.120 (1980).
17. In presenting the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA, Senator Javits, the minority
manager of the bill, stated his interpretation of the effect of the amendments: "[A]n employer will be permitted under the act, as amended, to maintain a defined contribution plan
...

which precludes employer . . . contributions to such a plan subsequent to an em-

ployee's attainment of the plan's normal retirement age.'? 124 CONG. REc. S4450 (daily ed.
Mar. 23, 1978). 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(1) (1980) states that: "A defined contribution plan may provide for the cessation of employer contributions after the normal retirement age of any participant in the plan. A defined contribution plan may also provide that
no employer contributions shall be made on behalf of an employee who is hired after normal
retirement age."
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plans, 18 they do not expressly require a showing of cost justification for the freezing of retirement benefits at the normal retirement age.1 9 Thus, under the 1980 interpretations, an employer is
not required to contribute to the pension plans of workers over the
normal retirement age, even if continued contributions would not
result in disproportionately higher costs.20
The issue has not yet been addressed directly by the courts.
The sole Supreme Court decision that addressed the provisions of
section 4(f)(2), United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann,21 dealt with interpretation of the word "subterfuge." The Court held that "subterfuge" implies intent and therefore an employer cannot be said
to have violated section 4(f)(2) in observing the terms of a pension
plan unless, in doing so, it intended to evade the purposes of the
Act.2 2 Because McMann held by this reasoning that a pension plan
established before the passage of the ADEA could not be subterfuge, the protection of the ADEA is limited to pension plans established since 1967.23 Thus, under federal law, the opportunity of
older workers to obtain equal rights to pension accrual is severely
curtailed.
This Note examines the problem of securing pension benefit
accrual for employees who continue to work after reaching the normal retirement age. The Note first evaluates the potential application of the ADEA to this issue, analyzing the impact both of regulatory and legislative interpretations and of judicial interpretation
of the Act. The Note then analyzes the effect of state fair employment laws on this issue, examining first the possibility of federal
preemption and second the potential impact of the contract clause
of the United States Constitution. The Note concludes that because the McMann intent requirement and the federal interpretations will effectively block any federal action and ERISA preempts
any state law or regulation protecting pension rights, the best
means of securing equality in pension plan rights is to amend federal law. Because the protection of the ADEA is limited to workers
under age seventy,24 and because ERISA is intended to regulate
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1) (1980).
See id. § 860.120(d), (f)(1)(iv)(B)(1),(3)-(4).
See id. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(5).
434 U.S. 192 (1977).
Id. at 203.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
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pension plan participation, 5 an amendment to ERISA would be
the more complete and appropriate solution.
Action Under the ADEA
Retirement benefits accrual maybe viewed either as compensation or as a term or condition of employment. 6 Applied to either
view, general principles of nondiscrimination and the case law applying those principles support the assertion of the right to equal
accrual of retirement benefits in the absence of sound reasons justifying discrimination. The principles embodied in the stated purpose of the ADEA, 7 which prohibits arbitrary age discrimination,
and the principles underlying the Equal Pay Act,2 8 which prohibits

sex discrimination in wages, militate against the use of an arbitrary
classification as a basis for lower pay. Similar principles, embodied
in both the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,9
prohibit arbitrary discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment.3 0 In applying these principles, courts have required
sound reasons justifying discrimination against women,3 1 minorities,3 2 and unions33 in the terms of retirement plans. Courts have
applied the same standard in cases of age discrimination regarding
other fringe benefits.34 Because no sound reason can be given for
25.

H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE. CONG. &

AD. NEws 4640.
26. In Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1948), the court stated that the benefits flowing from a retirement plan were probably
"wages" and certainly "conditions of employment" within the meaning of established labor
law principles.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976) provides: "It is therefore the purpose of this act to...
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment."
28. Id. § 206(d).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
30. Because Title VII and the ADEA contain identical language making it unlawful for
an employer to prohibit "discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976), it may be argued that they are based on similar principles.
31. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712 n.23
(1978).
32. See, e.g., Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
33. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1948).
34. See EEOC v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 489 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (D. Minn. 1980)
(concerning vested vacation plan rights); Tonka v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 20 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1978), afl'd, 592 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
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discrimination against older workers in retirement plans, by analogy their right to pension accrual should stand on a footing equal
to that of other workers.3 5 The ADEA nonetheless appears to have
been interpreted to the contrary.
Department of Labor and Congressional Opposition
Regulatory Interpretation

The interpretations promulgated by the DOLse in 1979 and
presently enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)37 provide that, although employers are required to
make equivalent contributions on behalf of older and younger
workers to all other kinds of benefit plans, employers are not required to make equivalent pension contributions for workers who,
though otherwise protected by the ADEA, are over the normal retirement age. 8
Because the interpretations are not binding, it is within judicial discretion to disregard them.3 9 Although in some instances
(1979) (concerning use of company vehicle as term of employment).
35. Because every year that an older employee continues to work shortens the potential duration of pension dependency, it cannot be argued that providing pension accrual to
older workers results in disproportionately higher costs. The argument that employers rely
on cutting off older workers' accrual to increase benefits to all workers under the plan is also
unsound. Although this may be a reason to end benefit accrual once a worker has reached
the maximum pension level, it does not justify cutting off workers at inadequate levels simply because of their age.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1980).
37. See 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,657 (1979).
38. See id. at 30,655-56.
39. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.1 (1980).
Even if a DOL interpretation is disregarded, however, it should be noted that any relief
obtained will be prospective only. Section 7(e) of the ADEA requires that the Act be enforced in accordance with section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 259 (1976). See
id. § 626(e) (Supp. 11 1979). See also Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, G.I.E., 18 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1167, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act provides
that no employer will be subject to liability for violation of a federal law incorporating § 10
if in violating the law the employer relied in good faith on h regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 259
(1976). Thus, a litigant will not be able to obtain damages for a past violation of the ADEA
permitted by the regulations. Rather, the litigant's remedy is limited to establishing his or
her right to accrue retirement benefits in the future. Once a court rejects the regulation, any
further reliance on it would not be in good faith; continued violation of the ADEA would
support a claim for damages despite the limitation imposed by § 10 of the Portal-to-Portal
Act.
Potential litigants also face difficult problems in obtaining counsel. Because there will
be no monetary recovery in the initial challenge of violations excused by bona fide reliance
on a regulation, private counsel will be reluctant to take such cases. If a litigant pays private
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courts have deferred without question to the greater expertise of a
regulatory agency,4 ° the deference accorded an interpretation generally depends on an evaluation of the "thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which *give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. '41 Furthermore,
although interpretations promulgated contemporaneously with a
congressional act should be accorded
great deference, those issued
42
years later are scrutinized closely.
,The current DOL interpretations of the ADEA are inconsistent with earlier pronouncements issued in conjunction with the
1967 Act and thus should not be accorded deference by the
courts.4 s The initial interpretations provided that a pension plan
would only be considered in compliance with the ADEA "where
the actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in behalf of
an older worker is equal to that made or incurred in behalf of a
younger worker."'44 Unlike the current interpretations, the original
1969 DOL interpretations contained no exception for workers over
the normal retirement age.
The reasoning behind the present interpretations is also suspect. Before issuing the current version, the DOL solicited comments on the proposed interpretations.45 In response to suggestions
submitted that discrimination in pension plans be tested under the
"cost consideration" rule applied to other benefit plans, the DOL
stated that its decision to treat pension accrual plans differently
from other employee benefit plans was mandated by the legislative
history.46 The "legislative history" relied upon, however, is merely
counsel out of pocket, the cost will likely swallow the value of pension benefits subsequently

accrued; yet, the public agency charged with bringing such suits is unlikely to bring an action challenging its own regulation. There are also unusual problems in bringing a class
action to pool resources. See Note, The Class Action Suit under the Age Discriminationin
Employment Act: Current Status, Controversies, and Suggested Clarifications, 32 HAsTINGS

L.J. 1377 (1981).

40. See, e.g., Hodgson v. American Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225, 22829 (D. Minn. 1971).
41. Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
42. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976).
43. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1980) with 34 Fed. Reg. 9,709 (1969) (original version of § 860.120). The change in the interpretations seems unrelated to any change in the
Act itself. See notes 53-4 & accompanying text infra.
44. 34 Fed. Reg. 9,709 (1969).
45. See 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264 (1978).
46. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,649 (1979).
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the echoing by the authors of the 1978 amendments of a preliminary interpretation, prepared by the DOL, of the proposed amendments to section" 4(f)(2). 47 That interpretation states without explanation that section 4(f)(2) would not require equal pension
accrual rights for workers thereby enabled to continue working after the normal retirement date.48 Further research into the sources
cited by the DOL reveals no basis for this interpretation, only the
repeated assertion of the manner in which section 4(f)(2) is to be
interpreted. 9
The true obstacles for the litigant lie not with the DOL interpretations, however, but with the role assigned to the interpretations and the enforcing agency by the courts. The courts have disregarded agency interpretations of section 4(f)(2) in the past, but
in those cases the interpretations favored the employee over the
employer. 0 Here the litigant will have to present the unusual argument that not only are the interpretations overly harsh on the employee, but that the agency normally representing the employee's
interest now favors the employer. This novel recasting of roles will
undoubtedly make the employee's burden even greater.
Legislative History
The sponsors of the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA repeatedly voiced their concurrence with later DOL interpretations of
section 4(f)(2). 8 1 This congressional opposition to the testing of
pension plan discrimination under the cost consideration rule,
however, should be given little weight in the interpretation of the
statute.
47. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 509; 124 CONG. REc. H2271 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1978).
48. See note 47 supra.

49. The preliminary interpretation by the DOL cites to ProposedAmendments to the
Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967: Hearingson S. 1784 Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977) (statement of Donald E. Elisburg). This statement likewise does not disclose the DOL's reasoning.
The failure of the DOL to provide a more probative explanation for the interpretation than
that it was mandated by legislative history suggests that, in fact, there is no good explanation. The DOL's responsibility for the legislative history makes the conclusory nature of its
reasoning even more inexcusable.
50. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 196 n.4 (1977); Brennan v.
Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1974); Dunlop v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 415
F. Supp. 330 (D. Haw. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763
(9th Cir. 1978).
51. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
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Comments about a 1967 act by legislators in 1978 are not truly
part of the legislative history.5 2 Although the members of Congress
endorsing the interpretation were commenting on the effect of the
1978 Amendments to the Act, the portion of the Act whose language they were interpreting was the "subterfuge" clause, which
was unchanged by the 1978 Amendments." The 1967 hearings on
the Act contain no such interpretation of that language.5 Concededly, the original Act's subterfuge clause was subject to new interpretation in light of the 1978 Amendments. A prevailing rule of
statutory interpretation holds that statutory language has no
meaning by itself and only acquires meaning through application
to facts.55 Here the meaning of "subterfuge" in the context of retirement benefits accrual for persons working after the normal retirement age is considered for the first time. The 1978 comments of
legislators might therefore be considered as indirectly adding to
the legislative history of the "subterfuge" clause of the Act.
Even if part of the legislative history, however, these legislative comments are immaterial to the interpretation of the statute.
Legislative history generally may be cited only to explain the
meaning of the statutory language. 6 In this case, the legislative
history should be disregarded as ineffective in explaining the language of the statute. The statements of legislators regarding the
subterfuge clause should only be used insofar as they help explain
the statutory meaning of the word "subterfuge" and the other
words of that clause. The conclusory statements of the legislators
endorsing the later DOL interpretations, however, do not help explain the language. By endorsing the proposition that, in general, a
subterfuge is a discriminatory benefit plan not having a "sound
business or economic purpose" 57 while also stating that the same
interpretation need not be used in the logically indistinguishable
situation of pension plan participation of older workers,5 the legis52. "Legislative observations 10 years after the passage of the Act are in no sense part
of the legislative history." United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976).

54. See Age Discriminationin Employment Act 1967: Hearings on S.830 before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st

Sess. (1967).
55. J. SUTHsj
ND,STATUTES AN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973).
56. See Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976);
United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).

57. See 124 CONG. REc. S4450-51 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
58. Id.; id. at H2271 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1978) (remarks of Congressman Dent).
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lators' comments confuse rather than explain the meaning of the
section 4(f)(2) language. Congressional comment on section 4(f)(2)
thus should not be relied upon in interpreting the statute.
The Intent Requirement of McMann
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann 9 the only Supreme
Court case to construe section 4(f)(2), the Court held that a pension plan that discriminated against older workers would not be a
"subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the ADEA unless the employer actually intended to evade the law.60 Under the McMann
rule, no pension plan can be considered a "subterfuge" to evade
the purposes of the ADEA unless it was devised or significantly
altered after the ADEA was enacted. 1
In McMann, the Court approved of a pension plan that required mandatory retirement of workers at age sixty.6 2 In so doing,

the Supreme Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision that
mandatory retirement constitutes a subterfuge if the employer
cannot show a "business or economic reason" to justify such a requirement. 8 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that section 4(f)(2) did
not protect pension plans used to evade the purposes of the Act
and that because one of the stated purposes was to "prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment," a pension plan that discriminated without sound reason would be considered a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of the Act.6
The Supreme Court majority disagreed with this reasoning by
holding. that it was not possible to evade the purposes of an act
without evading the act itself,65 and that, because the word subterfuge means "strategem" or "artifice of evasion," an employer must
intend to evade the law to be excluded from the protection of section 4(f)(2).6 6 Accordingly, the Court reasoned, any plan devised
before the enactment of the ADEA in 1967 could not be subter59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
U.S. 192
64.
65.
66.

434 U.S. 192 (1977).

Id. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 194.
McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434
(1977).
542 F.2d at 220.
434 U.S. at 203.
Id.
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fuge.6 7 This rule presents a serious obstacle to older workers seeking to secure more equitable pension plans, because a great many

plans predate the ADEA.

s

The reasoning of the Court in McMann may be criticized on
several grounds. The Court apparently determined that the statute
was unambiguous and that it therefore need only look to the plain
meaning of the statutory language.6 9 In fact, few sections of the

ADEA are more ambiguous. A "subterfuge" has been variously interpreted to mean a plan not providing substantial benefits,7 0 a

plan without a "business or economic purpose,"'1 or, as in McMann, a "strategem" or "artifice of evasion. 7 2 The Fourth Circuit
and Supreme Court disagreed over whether it was possible to

evade the purposes of the Act before the Act itself came into existence.73 There is even dispute over whether an employer is merely
observing the terms of a retirement plan if he or she retires an
employee under discretionary plan provisions when retirement is

not mandatory.74

67. Id. The majority distinguished legislative history which showed that § 4(f(2) was
intended to apply to both new and existing plans by stating that the legislative language
referred only to that portion of § 4(f)(2) that prohibits using a pension plan to discriminate
in the hiring of older workers. Presumably then, the majority is suggesting that the legislative language does not refer to the subterfuge clause. See id. at 203 n.9.
68. Some writers, perhaps thinking that the Supreme Court interpretation of the subterfuge clause is not controlling outside the context of mandatory retirement, have not
found a general intent requirement. See Player, Defenses Under the Age Discriminationin
Employment Act: Misinterpretation,Misdirection, and the 1978 Amendments, 12 G&. L.
REv. 747, 776-79 (1978); Note, Federal Age Discriminationin Employment Act: The Pension Plan Exception after McMann and the 1978 Amendments, 54 NoTax DAms LAW. 323
(1978).
69. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
70. See Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1978); Cowlinshaw
v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Marshall v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 461 F. Supp..362, 374 (D. Md. 1978).
71. See McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434
U.S. 192 (1977).
72. 434 U.S. at 203.
73. Id. at 198.
74. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1978) (so
long as preexisting retirement plan paid "substantial benefits," employer did not violate
ADEA by retiring a worker before age 65); Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 910 (3d Cir.
1977) (involuntary retirement before age 65 at less than maximum pension benefits held not
violative of the ADEA when undertaken pursuant to a preexisting retirement plan); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362, 375 (D. Md. 1978) (same); Cowlinshaw v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that while a discretionary plan is not automatically outside ADEA section 4(f)(2) protection, plaintiff has the
burden of showing that the early termination option was exercised due to age alone); Han-
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Because the language is ambiguous, the Court should have
made a concerted effort to determine the legislative intent underlying the subterfuge clause in section 4(f)(2).75 Senator Javits, the
author of section 4(f)(2),76 stated in 1977 that the section would
not exempt preexisting benefit plans from the antidiscrimination
provisions of the ADEA. 77 Although "[iegislative observations 10
years after passage of the Act are in no sense part of the legislative
history,""8 an interpretation by the author of the provision in question,79 even if first provided ten years after passage of the Act,
should be entitled to great deference when there is a dispute as to
the meaning of that provision.80
Even if an existing pension plan cannot be interpreted as a
subterfuge, however, the reasoning may justify a finding that the
plan is outside the 4(f)(2) exception. A plan is not entitled to the
protection of section 4(f)(2) unless it is also "bona fide." 81 The McMann Court did not address the meaning of "bona fide" because
both parties had agreed, perhaps too hastily, that the plan was
bona fide merely because "it exist[ed] and paid benefits.

8

2

This

definition of bona fide is by no means the only established interpretation. Another line of cases has interpreted the term "bona
fide" to require that pension benefits not only exist but are substantial.88 A pension plan that fails to accrue adequate retirement
benefits because employer contributions cease for an arbitrary reason-such as the attainment of age sixty-five-could be viewed as
insubstantial and therefore not bona fide and not entitled to the
section 4(f)(2) exception.
nan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 443 F. Supp. 802, 805 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (holding that discriminatory application of a retirement plan violated the ADEA).
75.

J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (4th ed. 1973).

76. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: Hearings on S.830 Before
the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 27 (1967).
77. See 124 CONG. REC. S4450-51 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
78. 434 U.S. at 200 n.7.
79. See note 76 & accompanying text supra.
80. Compare 434 U.S. at 199-202 with id. at 208-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976).
82. 434 U.S. at 194.
83. See Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1978); Cowlinshaw
v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Marshall v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362, 374 (D. Md. 1978); McKinley v. Bendix Corp., 420 F. Supp. 1001,
1003 (W.D. Mo. 1976); see also Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 909 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring "payment not unreasonable").
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It also can be argued that the objective "business or economic
purpose" test proposed by the lower court in McMann84 would be
better suited to test the "bona fides" of a plan than to test whether
the plan is a subterfuge, a term which implies subjective qualities
such as intent.8 5 The Supreme Court did not hold invalid the application of such a test to determine whether a plan is bona fide; it
never reached the issue.86
The "bona fides" of a benefit plan have generally been tested
by objective considerations such as whether the plan actually paid
the promised benefits,87 whether the benefits were substantial,88
and whether the plan had been disclosed adequately.8" However
the test is framed, it asks the same question: does the plan comply
with objective standards of fairness? It thus is possible that the
objective economic or business purpose test introduced by the 1969
DOL interpretations 0 and endorsed by the current DOL interpretations 91 is still viable to test the bona fides of a plan despite the
Supreme Court holding in McMann that such a test could not be
used to determine whether a plan is a "subterfuge."
Action Under State Law
Because of the obstacles facing an aggrieved older worker attempting to invoke federal protection, the worker may look to state
law for protection of pension accrual rights. Currently, six states
prohibit age discrimination without any type of exception for pension plans.92 Twenty-six states have age discrimination laws containing exceptions similar to those of the ADEA for bona fide pen84. McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434
U.S. 192 (1977).
85. See Player, Defenses Under the Age DiscriminationAct: Misinterpretation,Misdirection, and the 1978 Amendments, 12 GA. L. REv. 747, 767-79 (1978).
86. See 434 U.S. at 203. The issue of the bona fides of the plan was not reached because it had been conceded. Id. at 194, 203.
87. See Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 1974).
88. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1978).
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1979).
90. See 34 Fed. Reg. 9,709 (1969).
91. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1) (1980).
92. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Supp. 1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 151B, § 4
(West 1971 & Supp. 1981); MONT.REv. CODES ANN. § 49-2-303 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
28-1-7 (1977); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
28-5-5.2 (1979 & Supp. 1980). See also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 28, §§ 6-1 to 6-16 (1956) (Puerto
Rico).
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sion plans or for plans that are not a subterfuge. 3 Because these
state exceptions are not bound by the current DOL interpretations
of the ADEA or by the McMann holding, they could be interpreted
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in retirement benefits accrual.94 Only two states have adopted age discrimination laws with
a specific exception allowing employers to discriminate in pension
benefits accrual. 9 5
The difficulty in turning to state law is the obstacle of federal
preemption. The issue of preemption by ERISA has been raised in
several cases involving state fair employment laws governing equal
rights to fringe benefits, specifically women's rights to pregnancy
benefits. 96 Moreover, it could be charged that such employment93. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463(F)(4)(b) (West Supp. 1980-81); CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 1420.1, 1420.15 (West Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-126(b)(5) (West Supp.
1980); DmL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(h) (West 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.167 (8)(b) (West

Supp. 1981); GA. CODE § 89-1708(c)(5) (1980); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-9(4) (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 44-1602 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 883 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IowA CODE
§ 601A.13 (West Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.110(2)(e) (1970 & Supp. 1980); LA. REv.
STAT. § 23:972(F)(2) (West Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4573.1.B (West 1979);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 16(g)(4) (1979); MICH. Cobe. LAws § 37.2202(c)(2) (Supp. 1980);
NEn. REV. STAT. § 48-1111 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.350(4) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-2.1 (West 1976); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296.3-a(c) (McKinney Supp. 1980); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4112.02(o)(2) (Page Supp. 1980); On. REV. STAT. §§ 659.028, .030 (1979-80);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-105, -125 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6(3) (Supp.
1979); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.44.090(2) (1962); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a) (1979); Wis. STAT.
§ 111.32(5)(c) (West 1974). The District of Columbia has adopted a similar law. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 6-2222 (Supp. 1980).
94.

See text accompanying notes 63-64, 81-86 supra.

95. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8.VUI.(a) (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. § 363.02(b)
(Supp. 1981). It should also be noted that age limits for the group of individuals statutorily

protected from age discrimination vary from state to state.
96. State courts have almost uniformly held that ERISA does not preempt state fair
employment, divorce, or community property laws. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnston, 85

Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980); Illinois Bell
Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 68 IM.App. 3d 829, 386 N.E.2d 599 (1979);
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 608 P.2d 1047 (Mont.
1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 61 A.D.2d 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978) (mem.); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State
Human Rights Appeal Bd., 60 A.D.2d 943, 401 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1978) (mem.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1073 (1979); Gast v. State ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 87 Wis.
2d 56, 273 N.W.2d 786 (1978); Time Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 391 (Cir. Ct. of Dane County, Wis. 1978). But see Amer-

ican Chain & Cable Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, No. CE 6-2938 (Dist. Ct. Polk County,
Iowa, June 28, 1978) (unpublished opinion).
The federal courts generally agree that state divorce and community property laws are
not preempted by ERISA. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d
Cir. 1979); Senco of Fla., Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Carpenters Pen-
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related laws violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.9 7 Although the successful assertion of a contract clause violation is unlikely,98 the case for ERISA preemption is strong,99 and,
at least in federal courts, may present a serious obstacle to plaintiffs alleging discrimination in the accrual of pension benefits. 100
ERISA Preemption
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA to prevent abuses in pension plan funding and forfeiture by regulating participation, vesting, funding, and disclosure.101 Although ERISA contains a provision subordinating the Act to any other federal law,10 2 the Act is
intended to provide nationally uniform regulations of pension and
similar plans;10 3 thus section 514 provides that, with a few narrow
exceptions,104 ERISA preempts state laws "insofar as they ...

re-

late to" employee benefit plans,0 5 regardless of whether the state
laws regulate the plans "directly or indirectly."10
sion Trust for S. Cal. v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Stone v. Stone,
450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978). But see Francis v.! United Technologies Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978); General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich.
1976). See also Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). The federal courts are split,
however, as to whether state fair employment law is preempted. Compare Bucyrus-Erie Co.
v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 453 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Wis. 1978), aff'd,
599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980) (holding state fair employment law requiring that employer-funded disability plan provide pregnancy benefits not
preempted by ERISA) with Pervel Indus., Inc. v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights &
Opportunities, 468 F. Supp. 490 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980) (holding that state law regulating disability plans is preempted
by ERISA).
97. See notes 165-72 & accompanying text infra.
98. See notes 166-82 & accompanying text infra.
99. See notes 101-06, 122-26, 132 & accompanying text infra.
100. For an example of the differential treatment given the preemption issue in state
and federal courts, see note 96 supra.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976). See Gast v. State ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441,
452, 454, 585 P.2d 12, 20-21 (1978).
102. "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States.. or any rule or regulation issued
under any such law." Id. § 1144(d).
103. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197, 29,933 (1974).
104. ERISA does not preempt state laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities,
see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (1976), or state criminal laws, see id. § 1144(b)(4).
105. "Except as provided... the provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan. . . ." Id. § 1144(a):
106. "The term 'State' includes a state.., or any agency [thereof] .

.,.

which pur-

ports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans
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Despite the seemingly unambiguous language, a number of
state courts have created additional exceptions to the preemption
provision. 07 These exceptions have almost exclusively concerned
three types of state laws: state health insurance laws regulating
health plan standards, 0 8 state community property or divorce laws
regulating allocation of pensions, °9 and state fair employment
practice laws requiring employers to provide pregnancy disability
benefits. 0 Because some state fair employment practice laws also
regulate aspects of age discrimination,"' the reasoning that supports the exceptions to ERISA preemption carved out in the area
of fair employment might also justify an exception to ERISA preemption of state age discrimination laws that could be interpreted
to prohibit age discrimination in pension benefits accrual.
In deciding the preemption issue, the primary consideration is
the purpose of the federal statute involved." 2 The supremacy
clause of the Constitution" s mandates preemption whenever state
law interferes with the fulfillment of a federal statutory purpose." 4
When the intent of Congress is express, as when the federal statute
provides that state laws in specific areas are to be preempted, the
preemption question is settled." 5 When the statute contains no express preemption provision, however, the courts must discern congressional purpose from other sources and balance the federal interest in uniformity against the countervailing interest of the state
in preserving its police power."8" In such cases, the courts traditionally examine the statute and outside sources to ascertain
covered by this subchapter." Id. § 1144(c)(2).
107. See note 96 supra.
108. See, e.g., Insurers' Action Council v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
109. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr, 798
(1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980).
110. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 60 A.D.2d
943, 401 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1978) (mem.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
111.

See, e.g., CAL. LAm. CODE § 1420.1 (West Supp. 1980) (prohibiting age discrimina-

tion in employment); id. § 1420.15 (providing that an employer must allow an employee to
continue working past the normal retirement age set out in a pension plan).
112. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
113.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

114. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
115. See, e.g., Gast v. State ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441,454-55 n.9, 585 P.2d 12,
21 n.9 (1978) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979), as an example of a specific
preemption provision).
116. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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whether state and federal law conflict, 117 whether a federal scheme
would be frustrated by the existence of state law,"' whether Congress intended to "occupy the field," ' 19 and whether another similar reason for preemption exists.12 20 In the absence of persuasive
reasons, there is no preemption. '

Recognizing the existence of an express preemption provision
in ERISA, some courts have held that its terms must be honored
to the extent possible. 2 2 This approach brings even peripherally
related state laws within the preemption provision because it governs any state law that attempts to regulate employee benefit plans
either "directly or indirectly."' 23 Such a broad interpretation of

ERISA preemption is supported by the argument that, if ERISA
were not intended to displace state laws peripherally related to
benefit plans, its designers would not have set out specific excep12
tions to the preemption provisions in such areas as criminal law.
An interpretation exempting all peripherally related state laws
would make such specific provisions superfluous.
The legislative history of ERISA also supports a broad preemption approach. 25 Earlier drafts of the preemption provision
that specifically set out areas to be preempted were rejected by
Congress in favor of a draft intended to be interpreted in its
6
"broadest sense.'

2

However, because the express preemption provision in ERISA
so vaguely defines the state laws to be preempted, some courts
have, to differing extents, analyzed the potential conflict as if there
were no preemption provision.

27

These courts, relying on the ab-

117. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978).
118. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1942); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1918).
119. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
120. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1941).
121. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
122. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1977), af'd,
571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); Francis v. United Technologies
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
123. See note 106 & accompanying text supra (emphasis added).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4).
125. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Congressman Dent). See National

Carrier's Conference v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
126. See National Carrier's Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914, 916-17
(D. Conn. 1978).
127. See Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 453
F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Wis. 1978), aft'd, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031
(1980); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp.
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sence of any specific indication that state fair employment laws are
to be preempted, have applied several variations of the traditional
analysis -and have held that state fair employment laws simply do
not "relate to" benefit plans in the ERISA sense. 128 The methods
of analysis that courts have used include: (1) a "proximity" theory
that determines that Congress did not intend ERISA to preempt
fair employment laws regulating disability plans because ERISA
regulates only pension plans, and preemption thus would create an
undesired regulatory void;12 9 (2) a similar theory that reasons that
Congress did not intend to preempt state laws having only a "peripheral" effect on benefit plans when those state laws are well established instruments of the state's vital police power;1 30 and (3) a
purely traditional approach that finds that preemptive intent may
not be presumed when ERISA neither conflicts with state fair employment laws nor contains a broad scheme for regulating disability plans, which would evidence congressional intent to occupy the

field."'
Even if the preemption provision is not broadly construed, the
use of these variations on traditional preemption analysis which
have been applied to laws regulating disability plans should not be
applied to the regulation of pension plans. Pension plans are without question the subject matter of ERISA. The enforcement of
ERISA leaves no regulatory void concerning the pension rights of
older workers because, although ERISA itself is silent, plan participation rights of older workers are specifically set out in the federal
regulations.3 2
919 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Insurers' Action Council v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976);
In re Marriage of Pardee, 408 F. Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State
Div. of Human Rights, 61 A.D.2d 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978) (mem.); Gast v. State ex rel
Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978).
128. See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Mountain States TeL
& Tel. v. Commissioner of Labor, 608 P.2d 1047, 1057-58 (Mont. 1979).
129. Note, ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of "Relate to" in Section
514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143, 151-53 (1980).
130. See Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867, 872-73 (D.N.J.), affd
on rehearing,464 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1978); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 931-33 (N.D.
Cal. 1978); In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 909-10, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798, 804
(1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980).
131. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Gast
v. State ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 452-55, 585 P.2d 12, 20-22 (1978). In Avocado
Growers, the Supreme Court established the rule that "federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power ... [unless] Congress
has unmistakenly so ordained." 373 U.S. at 142.
132. 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(c)-1(e)(2) (1980).
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Courts, however, have not always relied exclusively on traditional analysis in holding that state discrimination laws should not
be preempted. Perhaps recognizing that such state laws do "relate
to" benefit plans in the ERISA sense,"" to avoid preemption of
state laws several courts have placed fair employment laws that
admittedly relate to benefit plans under the protection of the federal-law savings clause1 ' by treating the state laws as extensions of
Title VII. 5
The federal law savings provision of ERISA, section 514(d), 36
provides that ERISA is superseded when it would "alter, amend,
modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede" any other federal law,
rule or regulation. 13 7 Because Title VII validates concurrent state
nondiscrimination laws that are not inconsistent with it-Title VII
specifically states that it does not establish any exemption from
state enforcement of state fair employment statutesS3 --at least
one federal court and several state courts have held that preemption of such state laws would alter the congressional scheme for
regulating employment discrimination. 3 9 This analysis, referred to
as the "double-savings clause" approach,

40

is offered as either the

primary or the only grounds for the holding.
The varying reception to the double-savings clause approach is
133. See note 105 supra.
134. See note 102 supra.
135. Title VII forbids employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin with regard to hiring, discharge, or compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). For cases using this approach, see
Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 453 F. Supp. 75, 79
(E.D. Wis. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980);
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 829, 835, 386
N.E.2d 599, 604 (1979); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Commissioner of Labor, 608 P.2d
1047 (Mont. 1979); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 61 A.D.2d 822, 823,
402 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978) (mem.).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976).
137. Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1976) providing that,
"[n]othing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of
State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as
invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the
purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof." See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Commissioner of Labor, 608 P.2d 1047, 1054 (Mont. 1979).
139. See cases cited in note 135 supra.
140. This savings provision, which appears in Title XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
applies as well to Title VII. For simplicity it will be referred to as the Title VII savings
clause.
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demonstrated by the conflicting holdings of two federal appellate
courts in pregnancy benefits cases. In Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations,14 1 the Seventh
Circuit used a double savings clause approach, 142 citing legislative
history that indicated that Title VII antidiscrimination provisions
were not to be preempted1 4s and reasoning that, because Title VII

encourages state law action, state pregnancy benefits laws were
also intended to be spared from preemption.1 4

Conversely, the

District Court of Connecticut, in Pervel Industries, Inc. v. Con45
necticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities,1
later affirmed by the Second Circuit, rejected the double savings
clause rationale, holding that the ERISA savings clause for federal
law could not be interpreted to refer to a scheme utilizing parallel
state law if that state law was broader than Title VII.

46

The dis-

trict14 court stated that ERISA could not be said to impair Title
VII

7

because the Supreme Court had previously held that preg-

nancy benefits were not protected under Title VI 1 45 and because
legislative history indicated that the ERISA preemption provision
was to be interpreted in its broadest sense. 4 9 The court added that
the legislative history indicating the intent to preserve antidiscrimination law referred only to the substantive provisions of Title
VII itself and not to state antidiscrimination laws that are broader
than Title VII. 50
The issues raised by these two cases are analogous to the issues raised in a consideration of whether the ADEA preserves parallel state laws from ERISA preemption. The ADEA contains a
provision much like the savings clause of Title VII,' 5 ' which preserves the jurisdiction of state agencies performing "like functions
with regard to discriminatory employment practices. 1
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

52

If it is as-

599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980).
599 F.2d at 210.
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 212.
468 F. Supp. 490 (D. Conn. 1978), af'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

444 U.S. 1031 (1980).
146.

Id. at 493.

147. Id.
148. Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
149. 468 F. Supp. at 492.
150. Id. at 493.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976). See also 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976), which provides that
"no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title [the ADEA] before the expiration of
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sumed that the ADEA "incorporates" state laws that protect the
retirement benefit accrual rights of employees past the normal retirement age, ERISA conceivably could be said to "impair" the
ADEA if such state laws were preempted. Before a comparison of
the ADEA and Title VII savings clauses is made, however, it
should first be determined whether the court's decision in Bucyrus-Erie Co. is a sufficiently sound application of preemption principles to justify using it in the ADEA situation.
The issue in Bucyrus-Erie Co., as in all the pregnancy disability cases, was whether the double-savings clause approach can be
used to exempt not merely coextensive state laws but also state
laws broader than their federal counterpart-that is, whether Title
VII can be said to be altered or impaired if parallel but broader
state law is preempted by ERISA. The argument in support of
broadly interpreted savings clause exemption follows two lines of
reasoning, neither of which is convincing.
The first line of reasoning holds that curtailing the jurisdictional reach of the state statute and limiting the scope of a savings
clause exemption to those state laws coextensive with Title VII
would alter Title VII by impairing the congressional federal-state
cooperative scheme for remedying employment discrimination. 153
It is difficult, however, to perceive how any "scheme" for federal-state cooperation would be significantly affected by ERISA
preemption of state fair employment laws relating to pregnancy
benefits. ERISA preempts state fair employment laws only insofar
as they relate to employee benefit plans; elimination of that portion of state fair employment laws regulating employee benefit
plans would neither impair the other fair employment functions of
the state agency nor alter the deferral requirement. The rights expressly protected by Title VII would continue to be protected by
the state; only rights not embraced by Title VII protection would
be subject to preemption.
The other line of reasoning holds that restricting ERISA preemption when it would alter federal law means preserving not
merely the substantive provisions of other federal law, but also the
state laws that the federal law would not preempt.'" This analysis
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under [parallel] state law, unless such
proceedings have been earlier terminated ...."
153. See Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 599
F.2d 205, 210 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980).
154. See cases cited in note 135 supra.
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asserts, in effect, that Title VII should be interpreted affirmatively
to protect the broader state laws that it does not preempt. Carried
to a logical conclusion, this view would preserve any state law except one directly conflicting with Title VII. Yet there is no indication in Title VII that broader state fair employment laws are
thereby incorporated into an overall Title VII scheme to provide as
broad a protection as possible. Such an interpretation exaggerates
the function of Title VII. In fact, Title VII was designed to supplement state law, 155 not to incorporate state law into some larger
scheme. Title VII therefore should not bar preemption of broader
state nondiscrimination laws by other federal statutes.
Even if the ERISA federal law savings clause could be said to
exempt from preemption state laws regarding pregnancy benefits
through the Title VII savings clause, the ERISA savings clause
should not be interpreted to exempt broader state laws protecting
pension rights through the ADEA deferral provision. Unlike Title
VII, the language of the ADEA does not suggest that it is part of a
broader scheme. 156 The ADEA savings provision merely states that
the jurisdiction of the federal enforcement agency does not affect
the jurisdictions of state agencies "performing like functions with
regard to discriminatory employment practices on account of
age. ..

.

This is a much narrower provision than the Title VII

provision, which encompasses "any present or future law of any
State ... other than any such law which purports to require or
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII]." 15 In fact, it has been argued
that, under traditional preemption analysis, the ADEA should be
interpreted to preempt state law with a broader scope than the
ADEA. 159
The legislative history of the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA
also supports a narrow scope of any possible "double savings
clause" preemption exemption. Senators Javits and Williams, the
155. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) states: "The clear
inference [from the legislative history of Title VII] is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination."
156. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1976).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1976) (emphasis added).
159. See Comment, The 1967 Age Discriminationin Employment Act and Preemption: A Case for Broader State Laws, 12 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 283 (1978).
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principal architects of ERISA, stated unequivocally in a colloquy
concerning the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA that the ADEA
should not be considered to shelter the state laws it does not preempt. 6 0 Although the Senators were interpreting the language of a
section of the ADEA that was passed in 11967, and hence their comments may not be given the interpretative weight of legislative history, no rule of statutory construction prevents the use of their interpretation when it aids in interpreting the language of that
section. 16 1
Finally, it would not be possible to support the disputed
double-savings clause theory under the ADEA to the extent possible under Title VII. Possibly because the double-savings clause
theory hinges on a questionable interpretation of the intention of
Title VII's savings clause, many courts have not relied on that approach alone, but have used it in conjunction with arguments that
state law does not "relate to" employee benefit plans in the sense
intended by ERISA. 62 Indeed, some courts have used the doublesavings clause approach as an argument for the traditional, legislative purpose approach-that the existence of the savings clause
shows a congressional purpose to leave the existing enforcement of
Title VII and related state laws unaffected by ERISA.16 3 As support for an argument showing a legislative purpose to spare state
laws affecting pension rights, however, the application of the
double-savings clause theory to the ADEA would be invalid. The
purpose of ERISA is to regulate pension plans,' 6 and even if the
ERISA preemption provision is not intended to affect disability
plans, it is designed to reserve even indirect regulation of pension
plans to Congress.
160.

1978).

124 CONG. REC. S4767 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1978). Id. at S4451 (dafly ed. Mar. 23,

supra.
161. See notes 57-59 & accompanying text
162. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 435 F.
Supp. 75 (E.D. Wis. 1978), affl'd, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031
(1980); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 68 Ill. App. 3d 829, 386
•N.E.2d 599 (1979); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Commissioner of Labor, 608 P.2d 1047(Mont. 1979) dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 61 A.D.2d 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978); Time Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 391 (Cir. Ct. of Dane County, Wis.
1978).
163. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations,
599 F.2d 205, 211 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1031 (1980).
164. See notes 101-103 & accompanying text supra.
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The Contract Clause
The contract clause of the United States Constitution provides
that no state shall pass any law impairing a contractual obligation. 6 " Because the terms of pension plan agreements are normally
set out by contract' between employer and employee, state law requiring nondiscriminatory pension plans may have the effect of altering conditions of employment established by contract and may
conceivably be said to impair the contract. Such laws should therefore be tested under contract clause analysis.
Two recent Supreme Court cases set forth the standard for
balancing constitutional protection afforded by the contract clause
against the right of a state to use its police power to protect vital
67
public interests.16 6 In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,
the Court held that to avoid violating the contract clause, state
regulation must be both necessary and reasonable."'8 In Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 69 the Court added an additional refinement-state law must protect "a basic societal interest, not a favored group."' 70
One factor the Court will examine in determining the necessity of the state action is the appropriateness of the state-legislation as a means of serving an important public interest.17 ' When

the state fails to make an initial showing of any social purpose to
justify a statute's existence, however, the courts need not reach the
issue of appropriateness to purpose. 7 2 Reasonableness is measured
both in terms of the financial burden imposed by a state law and
in light of the degree of reliance on the terms of the contract by
8
7
the party affected.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
166. "[The contract clause] does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as
are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the common
good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police
power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health,
morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under
contracts between individuals." Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
167. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
168. Id. at 29-32.
169. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
170. Id. at 242.
171. 431 U.S. at 29-32.
172. 438 U.S. at 247.
173. Id. at 244-50; 431 U.S. at 29-32.
165.
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A comparison of Allied Structural Steel, in which state law
was held to violate the contract clause, with an earlier case cited
therein, City of El Paso v. Simmons,7 which held the opposite,
provides a framework for applying the tests. Allied Structural
Steel concerned a Minnesota counterpart to ERISA that required
an employer to provide pensions for all Minnesota employees who
had worked at least ten years, and to pay a "pension funding
charge" if the pension fund was insufficient to cover full pensions
for all such employees if the employer terminated a pension plan
or closed the Minnesota business.1 75 The Court held that the Min-

nesota law violated the contract clause because it imposed a heavy
financial burden on a very narrow group of employers in a manner
that greatly affected an employer's obligation under a portion of
the contract on which the employers had relied-the funding of
the pension plan.1 7 1 In City of El Paso v, Simmons, in contrast, the
State of Texas had merely imposed a five-year statute of limitations on what was previously a perpetual right of reinstatement on
defaulted land claims that the state had granted buyers of land.
The Court found the burden on defaulting buyers not unreasonable177 and that the contract terms affected by the Texas statutes
were minimally relied on, and rejected the contention that buyers
had been induced to enter into the contracts on the basis of an
everlasting reinstatement right.""
Citing El Paso as an example, the Court in Allied Structural
Steel noted that when the impairment of the contract is slight, the
state may not be required to demonstrate its breadth of scope of
necessity. 17 9 Under these criteria, state laws requiring nondiscriminatory participation in pension plans would not so impair employment contracts as to be unconstitutional. The effect on the existing
contractual relationship of a state statute mandating pension plan
nondiscrimination would be slight; the additional benefits accrued
174. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).

175. 438 U.S. at 238.
176. Id. at 246.
177. 379 U.S. at 515.
178. Id. at 514.
179. "In applying these principles. . . the first inquiry must be whether the state law
has, in fact, operated as a substantialimpairment of a contractual relationship.. . . Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature
and purpose of the legislation." 438 U.S. at 245 (emphasis added).
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by a nonretiring employee would be minimal,180 and it is unlikely
that employers anticipated saving money by hiring older workers
when they first entered into contracts containing pension plans.
Even if the necessity and scope tests are invoked, state age
discrimination laws should be upheld. The number of employers
affected is not narrow; it has been estimated that over thirty million workers are covered by private pension plans'18-a number
which certainly must place age discrimination legislation outside of
the disapproved category of legislation favoring only a particular
group. Rather, the statute protects the broad societal interests in
nondiscrimination on the basis of age in the work force and in providing adequate pension benefits to all employees. Thus, even if
the inquiry goes beyond the first stage, the court will not find that
such state laws violate the contract clause.

Conclusion
This Note has attempted to eviiate the feasibility of an action brought to prevent discrimination in the terms of pension
plans against workers over the normal retirement age. Because the
right to equal pension fund contributions is as basic as the right to
equal pay for equal work, pension rights should be universally protected by federal law. Although a theoretical argument can be
made for invoking the protection of federal law on the ground that
discriminatory pension plans do not satisfy the ADEA "bona fides"
requirement, the current chances of success under either federal or
state law are slight.
The ADEA could be amended to provide for a discriminatory
impact standard rather than an intent standard, but the recently
enacted age limit of seventy would still exclude many older workers from its protection. Raising the age limit of the ADEA, however, might produce undesired effects on other provisions of the
ADEA. Amending ERISA would be the best solution. Guaranteeing older workers the right to participate in pension plans would
180. If, however, a state statute were held to apply retroactively, and an employer
therefore was required to make substantial back payments, the state statute might be held
to violate the contract clause for precisely the reasons set out in Allied StructuralSteel. 438
U.S. at 246. Thus, the effective date of a retroactive state statute may bear upon the determination of contract impairment.
181. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93D CONG., 2D SEsS. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4641.

May 1981]

EXCEPTIONS AND PREEMPTION

1345

be consistent with the other functions of the Act, such as regulation of pension plan participation. In effect, such an amendment
would simply be the revision that ERISA has needed since the
abolishment of mandatory retirement.

